The concept of "abused collective memory" gathers two of Ricoeur's main lines of concern: history and psychoanalysis. The article aims to explain how this convergence was possible, especially, when the transposition of the Freudian metapsychology from the individual to the collective level was hindered by the Ricoeurian emphasis on the Freudian libidinal economy. Our hypothesis is that this convergence required two intermediate steps. The first one gathered psychoanalysis and history within the larger framework of otherness as flesh. The second step was a transcendental turn, which would lead Ricoeur to inquire about the structures of collective existence that make it possible to apply psychoanalytic categories at that level, rather than considering how this transposition can be done. By taking this turn Ricoeur found that a phenomenology of the capable human being was the condition of possibility of a temporal ontology, and then, could describe this ontology as the condition of possibility of his phenomenology.
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opinion, Freud's Papers on Metapsychology were the most successful in terms of fusing the economy of instincts and language in the so-called "first topography" (unconscious, preconscious and conscious). Although Freud had already abandoned the use of biological language at that stage, Ricoeur still thought that since this topography retained a connection with the economy of instincts it was still associated with the individual. That meant that metapsychology was thematized within an isolated psychism, which did not take account of intersubjective relations, and so could not be used to give an account of collective behaviours. In the second part of the paper, we will explain how Ricoeur managed to overcome that obstacle. We will argue that he did so in two steps. The first one was taken in the context of "a dialogue" between Ricoeur and Freud, which was constructed in the mid-1990s and placed psychoanalysis and history under the same figure of the meta-category of the other: the flesh. The second step was Ricoeur's decision to take a transcendental turn and try to identify the structures of collective existence that make possible the implementation of the psycho-analytical categories instead of raising the traditional questions about how to transpose those categories. This transcendental turn involved two different operations: the reduction of psychoanalysis to the phenomenology of the capable human being and, then, the reduction of this anthropology to a temporal ontology. Although the temporal ontology is based on Heidegger's existential analytic, that last reduction would not have been possible had Ricoeur not changed his approach to Heideggerian temporality after Time and Narrative III. According to our hypothesis, it was this change in his approach to Heideggerian temporality that allowed Ricoeur to homogenize the individual and the collective, thus rendering psychoanalysis compatible with Ricoeurian hermeneutics and, consequently, permitting the transposition of analytic categories to history. 5 Instinctual energy as the limit of collective analysis:
A traditional topic of debate in the reception of Freudian psychoanalysis concerns the object of its application. Does it apply only to individuals or to collectives as well? Neither Ricoeur nor other authors, such as Habermas, who worked on psychoanalysis from the perspective of hermeneutics, 6 could evade this discussion. During the 1960s and 1970s, Ricoeur thought that psychoanalysis should be applied only to individuals. Thus, in his essay on Freud he explained "moreover, in the Freudian topography that debate is projected onto a representation of the psychical apparatus in which only the 'vicissitudes of the instincts,' within an isolated psychism, are thematized. Stated bluntly, the Freudian systematization is solipsistic, whereas the situations and relations analysis speaks of and which speak in the analysis are intersubjective." 7 The reason for this solipsism lies in the concept of instinct, which Freud describes from a near-
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Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies biological point of view as follows: "an 'instinct' appears to us as a concept frontier between the mental and the somatic, as a psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind…" 8 As Ricoeur understood Freud's development, he did not think that the Austrian psychologist had translated the individual psychological categories into the sociology of culture.
Instead, he described that development in terms of a growing complexity in the analysis of the individual psyche, ranging from the first topography, which does not take intersubjectivity into account, to the second where others play a prominent role. This way of characterizing Freud's development leads Ricoeur to the conclusion that "the object of psychoanalysis is not human desire as such-by which we mean wishes, libido, instinct, and eros (all these words having a specific signification in their specific contexts)-but human desire understood in a more or less conflictual relation with culture […]: for these historical and systematic reasons, psychoanalysis is the theory of the dialectic between desire and culture." 9 Ricoeur highlighted Freud's recognition of both linguistic and extralinguistic aspects of the human condition. Jacques Sedat recognizes Ricoeur's interest in an "instinctual experience capable of being told," yet he states that " […] there is no instinctual experience susceptible of being said. The only thing that can be said is a representative experience. There is no pure instinct that can be said. The only thing that can be said arises from an activity of representation." 10 We do not think that this criticism should be attributed to Ricoeur, who besides distinguishing instinct from representation, stated that they are both articulated by the productive imagination in a synthetic operation that functions in a way similar to the Kantian schematism. 11 In a paper written at the end of 1970s, Ricoeur described the role of imagination as follows: "My own working hypothesis is that the universe of discourse appropriate for psychoanalytic discovery is not so much a linguistic one as one of fantasy in general.
[…] I shall suggest in concluding, however, that a theory of fantasy is perhaps more likely to account for the articulation of both the semiotic and the drive than is a linguistic theory." 12 In fact, Ricoeur rejected those post-Freudian trends, which reduced psychic problems to an economy of instincts. In this regard he agreed with
[Lacan´s] general attempt to break with the biologism and behaviorism attributed to postFreudian psychoanalysis and to 'return to Freud' by situating not only the analytic situation but also the operations of the unconscious operations, which the theory attempts to account for systematically, within the unique 'field of speech and language'." 13 However, he rejected Lacan's view that identifying the symbolic with language was a way of overcoming the limitations of economic explanation. In his opinion, reducing all psychic structures to language 14 interpretation does not constitute an alternative to the economic explanation; it simply prevents the latter from being reified by showing that the mechanisms that come under economics are accessible only in their relationship to hermeneutics. To say that repression is 'metaphor' is not to replace the economic hypothesis but rather to parallel it with a linguistic interpretation, and thus relate it to the universe of meaning without reducing it to that universe." 15 Nonetheless, during the 1970s and 1980s Ricoeur turned from a hermeneutics of the symbol to a hermeneutics of the text and narration, 16 and his investigations began to highlight narrative topics instead of issues of instincts. In papers published during that period of time, we can find some attempts to apply a rather narrativist approach to psychological pathologies. 17 The application of analytic categories to non-individual subjects became easier to accomplish thanks to this kind of development.
One of the goals of Memory, History, Forgetting was the application of psychoanalytic categories to collective memory, but one of the conditions for its success was to dissociate the traditional identification between memory and the individual. Ricoeur appealed to two different argumentative strategies in order to achieve this target, the first one was connected to memory and the second one to forgetting. The first one was a psychic development of Strawson's argument on multiple attribution. In Individuals, the mobility of attributions from oneself to someone other than oneself implies three different conditions: 1. the attribution can be suspended or performed; 2. these predicates retain the same sense in two different situations of attribution; 3. this multiple attribution maintains the dissymmetry between self-ascribable and otherascribable. 18 According to Ricoeur, memory fulfills these three conditions. The phenomenology of memory is developed in Memory, History, Forgetting in such a way that attribution is suspended, thus satisfying the first condition: It begins by asking about what is remembered, then, how memory works, and only at the end it is asked who remembers. The fulfillment of the first condition makes possible the second one, because after suspending the attribution, it is possible to attribute memory to different subjects without modifying its meaning. Finally, the fact that another different from me is unable to confirm memories in the same way that I do, confirms the third condition, that is, the dissymmetry of ascription.
The second strategy to dissociate the attribution of memory from individual subjects is 
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After dissociating memory from the individual, Ricoeur proposes a hermeneutic concept of memory: "But to speak of memory is not only to evoke a psychophysiological faculty which has something to do with the preservation and recollection of traces of the past; it is to put forward the 'narrative' function through which this primary capacity of preservation and recollection is exercised at the public level of language." 20 As this reduced definition of memory is shared by both the individual and the collective it excludes particularities that traditionally characterized individual and collective memory.
Despite the above mentioned changes, Ricoeur's phenomenology of forgetting prevents the proposed direct translation. Forgetting is first explained in Bergsonian terms as a passage from consciousness to unconsciousness. Unlike Freud, Bergson defined consciousness as the willingness to act and care for life, whereas the unconscious no longer acts directly on our lives as it is outside of our everyday concerns and is powerless. Since this explanation does not provide a strategy to account for the passage from forgetting to memory, Ricoeur appeals to Freud's concept of the unconscious and with this to the instinctual drives. 21 This addition explains memory diseases, linked to forgetting and repetition, as well as the possibility of overcoming them.
However, as already explained, instinctual energy despite having lost the biological connotations is still tied to the individual preventing, consequently, the direct translation of metapsychological categories at the collective level.
Transcendental reduction as the way for a psychoanalytical history:
The transposition of analytical categories to the collective level usually proceeds by analogy. In fact, Barash criticizes Ricoeur's interpretation by underlining the negative consequences of employing such analogies between the individual and collective levels.
According to Barash, the particularities of collective identity are lost in this process of translation, 22 affecting the use of categories like 'debt', 'duty of memory' and even 'work of memory'. As we explained at the beginning of this paper, Ricoeur's strategy is still more drastic than Barash's assertion, since he endeavours to achieve a direct transposition. However, the inclusion of the economy of instincts to explain mnemonic pathologies hinders this kind of translation. Our hypothesis is that in order to overcome this obstacle Ricoeur 24 One of the conditions highlighted by historians for applying the psychoanalytic categories to society is to find a common framework for history and psychoanalysis. This search for a common framework can be seen in the article "Uncanniness Many Times Over," which was published in 1994. In order to understand how this framework was developed, we must go back to the Tenth Study of Oneself as Another, where Ricoeur distinguished three types of passive experiences affecting the self-experience: the other as flesh, referred to the internal principle of action that we suffer but cannot master; otherness, indicating what is different from us and affects us; and finally, otherness as consciousness, enjoining us from the moral plane both within and above us. 25 Of these three figures, psychoanalysis was associated in Oneself as Another with the third one, due to the role of the superego, developed in "The Ego and the Id." 26 Moreover, in this book Ricoeur does not associate the past with any of these figures. On the basis of Time and Narrative, however, we may say that it is in this period that Ricoeur considered the past to be the other as otherness. Indeed, historical representation, as standing-for, is based on the trace and the trace as it "[…] is left by the past" 27 is something strange for us. Briefly, in this book, history and psychoanalysis did not share a common framework.
In "Uncanniness Many Times Over," Ricoeur returns to his analysis of the experience of the other. Although the triple experience of passivity remains the same, the figure of the flesh becomes more important than the other two. The Husserlian category of the flesh became the articulation point of oneself with the alter-ego. As Richard Kearney explains, the flesh "…is the pole of reference of all bodies belonging to this immanent nature of ownness. And it is by pairing one flesh with another that we derive the notion of an alter-ego. But here we return to the deeper paradox: flesh as a paradigm of otherness. Flesh is what is both most mine and most other. Closest to me and furthest from me at the same time." 28 Framing psychoanalysis and history under the metacategory of the flesh he modifies the way of conceiving both of them. Busacchi draws our attention to a modification in the treatment of psychoanalysis. 29 Instead of working on the superego Ricoeur studies drives and compulsion, as they were analyzed in "The Uncanny" and "Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through." 30 Ricoeur explains that Freudian uncanniness is caused by the feeling aroused by operations of the unconscious, which is at the same time close and strange. The second of these Freudian papers is associated with the first, and it aims to provide a psychoanalytic explanation of our inability to talk about trauma and indicates both how trauma operates and how it can be overcome.
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Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies acceptance. Linking together both meanings leads Ricoeur to argue that the task of translation is consistent and perfectible, although it is necessary to assume the impossibility of achieving absolute equivalence with the original. 32 In Memory, History, Forgetting the articulation of these two papers is really important because it links the anthropology of the capable human being with psychological pathologies. 33 In "Mourning and Melancholia," melancholy is described as a psychic condition in which selfregard is reduced due to the loss of a loved object. Mourning, on the other side, allows us to untie ourselves from the lost object and leads to a return of self-regard. Thus, Freudian analysis underlines the tension between libido, which ties us to the beloved object, and the reality principle, which forces us to deal with the disappearance of this object. This analysis also adopts the economy of instincts to explain how much energy is required for the libido to obey reality.
Although Ricoeur recalls significant examples of collective mourning, the economic

How does Paul Ricoeur apply metapsychology to collective memory?
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies characterization of the conception of work given in this paper prevents its transposition to the sphere of collective memory. 34 We think that it is not by accident that Ricoeur acknowledges that "Mourning and Melancholia" offers greater resistance than "Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through to any transposition to the plane of collective memory…" 35 On the other hand, Ricoeur highlights "Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through" because of its procedural component, which allows him to defend the thesis that psychoanalytic experience, far from being merely passive, has an active component that is present in all instances. Thus, "[…] the difficulties in question are not only undergone, but … we are responsible for them, as witnessed by the therapeutic advice that accompanies the working-through." 36 So characterized, "Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through" cannot only be included in a phenomenology of the capable human being but, due to the absence of any instinctual characterization, can also be transposed to the collective processes. In short, while "Mourning and Melancholia" provides the categories needed to understand psychological pathologies, it still employs an instinctual language that prevents its application to the collective. However, "Remembering, Repeating, Working-Through" refers to human capacities, and in so doing, allows itself to be "reduced" to a phenomenology of the capable human being. Since the article has no instinctual language, its conclusions are transferable to the collective level. Hence, each of these articles needs to be articulated with the other. As in the case of "Translation as Challenge and Source of Happiness," both articles are linked by the concept of work, and whereas the work of mourning is joined to the work of remembering, melancholy is associated with the compulsion to repeat. This articulation is described as follows: "What makes mourning a normal, albeit painful, phenomenon is that 'when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again'. It is from this angle that the work of mourning can be compared to the work of remembering. If the work of melancholia occupies a strategic position in the present essay, parallel to that occupied by the compulsion to repeat in the previous one, this suggests that it is as a work of remembering that the work of mourning proves to be liberating, although at a certain cost, and that this relation is reciprocal." 37 
We think that this description cannot explain by itself how the articulation of the work of mourning and the work of remembering is possible, because this articulation is not immediate but requires a third moment that catalyzes both kinds of work, something that does not exist in Freudian
metapsychology: happy memory. Happy memory can be defined as the utopian horizon that is established when the work of mourning is completed and the function of memory is properly fulfilled. As Ricoeur explains, "Yes, grief is that sadness that has not completed the work of mourning. Yes, joy is the reward for giving up the lost object and a token of the reconciliation
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Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies with its internalized object. And, inasmuch as the work of mourning is the required path for the work of remembering (souvenir), joy can also crown with its grace the work of remembering (mémoire). On the horizon of this work: a 'happy' memory, when the poetic image completes the work of mourning." 38 Taken together, these two Freudian conceptions of work allow Ricoeur to frame analytical solutions to mnemonic pathologies in the perspective of a phenomenology of the capable human being, and since it has no relation to the economy of instincts, it can be applied at the collective level. From this perspective, mnemonic pathologies can be described as incapability, but this description lacks the elements necessary for determining the reasons for these diseases and offering explanations as to how they might be worked through. We think that in order to explain both the work of memory and the reason for mnemonic pathologies Ricoeur takes a further step toward temporality as a more essential level of analysis: "I am adopting the guiding idea of Being and Time that temporality constitutes not only a major characteristic of the being that we are, but the characteristic that, more than any other, signals the relation of this being to being qua being. I have all the more reason to embrace this idea as I hold, moreover, the acceptation of being as act and as power as the one most in keeping with a philosophical anthropology of the capable human being." 39 The temporal analysis of Memory, History, Forgetting is radically different from that of Time and Narrative. The latter work described two conflicting traditions of temporal interpretation: a phenomenological and a cosmological one. In Ricoeur's opinion, although each of these traditions tried to overshadow its counterpart, neither of them was reducible to the other.
As an example of this tension, Ricoeur contrasted the Aristotelian conception of world time with the Augustinian time of the soul, Husserl's thematization of time with the Kantian interpretation.
Ricoeur expressed his close affinity with Heidegger's analytics, since it could integrate temporal moments prior to their separation. 40 Still, he expressed his dissatisfaction with a variety of problems arising from the strategy of gaining access to temporality by overlapping an ontic structure with the ontological level. The ontical component was Heidegger's personal conception of death, which became a structural moment of Dasein's being, and most specifically as its ownmost possibility. Since Dasein's anticipation of its own death isolates it from others and modifies its way of being, this conception of death maintained the aporetic relation between lived time and cosmic time. 41 Heideggerian resoluteness dislocated any possible dialogue between philosophical discourse related to Dasein and history. Despite his identification of being-towardsdeath as the source of all limits of Heidegger's temporal analytics, 42 Ricoeur sought to resolve the tension generated by the existential analytic in Time and Narrative by means of his concept of In his essay "The Mark of the Past," 43 and especially afterwards in Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricoeur proposes an alternative way of gaining access to temporality, beyond that of Being and Time, and this modification finally defines his general approach to time: death is defined as an irruption alien to human being, it is the end of life. 44 This conception of death, more akin to Sartre and Levinas, does not isolate the individual who faces this event from others and from the world, but maintains an openness to the externality and factuality. 45 This modification allows Ricoeur to collapse the distinction between the authentic and inauthentic modes of being, and consequently, the gap between the existential analytic and the factual sciences. The so-called short route of Heidegger, which establishes a direct link between the potentiality of being and mortality, is replaced by another long one, or as expressed by Ricoeur, "it is to the phenomenology open to futurity that I would like to contribute with the following remarks against the closed phenomenology of the being-toward-death." 46 One of the consequences of this change in the concept of time is that memory and history are intertwined, which means that discoveries and stories of history alter memory of the past and, correspondingly, collective memory affects research into the past. In Time and Narrative, the link between phenomenological and cosmological time was external to these temporal manifestations.
Ricoeur reinforced his concept of temporality with two Heideggerian concepts, in order to explain our relationship with the people who preceded us. The concept of 'generation' arises from the idea that the human condition is not primarily biological but is instituted in a symbolic process of affiliation. In the case of history, the social bond is instituted through the passage of indestructible. This conviction is inseparable from the thesis that the unconscious is zeitlos, timeless, when time is understood as the time of consciousness with its before and after, its successions, and coincidences." 47 This means that whoever is compelled to repeat the traumatic event as if she were present does so because of her inability to discriminate between different temporal levels. Consequently, the cure must also have a temporal component. By means of working-through, the traumatized person becomes aware of repressed memory after articulating it temporally. This is how "the work of mourning definitely separates the past from the present and makes way for the future. relation to the necessity of incorporating death within narrative, and with his idea of associating the historiographical operation with funerary rites. In his opinion, "the vis-a-vis of the historian is not only the dead for whom she constructs a scriptural tomb; the historian does not only strive to resuscitate the living of the past who are no longer but who once were, but also attempts to represent actions and passions." 50 The funeral rite is crucial in the work of mourning, for, when dead people are buried, it makes place for the living: "Greater still, repetition allows us to complete and to enrich the meditation proposed above under the heading of death in history.
This led us to the act of sepulcher by which the historian, providing a place for the dead, makes a place for the living. A meditation on repetition authorizes a further step, following the idea that the dead of the past once were living and that history, in a certain manner, moves closer to their having-been-alive." 51 The historian plays a central role in this work of remembering and grief, helping to think the collective in its link to the past. 52 In this process, the historical plot gives the traumatic event a temporal framework. The different ways in which the plot relates the space of experience to the horizon of expectation, intensifying or relaxing the debt to the past, signals a function of the productive imagination that was not originally contemplated in Time and Narrative. 53 In this sense, the following statement is quite enlightening: "If, in fact, the facts are In recent decades, philosophy of history has faced the problem of justifying the mnemonic turn that occurred during the 1990s. One of the most complex issues was to provide a framework of intelligibility for the transposition of psychoanalytic categories to large groups of people affected by violent processes. Although originally associated with survivors of the Nazi death camps, its application was extended to various fields of recent history. One of the objectives of Memory, History, Forgetting was to provide a collective framework, but instinctual drive became the major obstacle for its elaboration. Beginning with his first works, Ricoeur was interested in both psychoanalysis and history. However, until 2000 Ricoeur worked on both issues almost completely in parallel. As an example of this, in Time and Narrative, there are only ten references to Freud, and almost all of them are related to the treatment of personal identity. Over the years, Ricoeur's thought on these issues underwent several changes, bringing these two domains closer together and producing a viable articulation between them. We have shown that the dialogue with Freud after Oneself as Another had an important influence in this articulation, framing psychoanalysis and history under the metacategory of otherness as flesh. Regarding the transposition of psychoanalytic categories from the individual to the collective sphere, we have argued that the economy of instincts prevented the kind of direct accomplishment of this transposition that Ricoeur had envisaged. In fact, we held that in order to achieve such a transposition, Ricoeur had to carry out a transcendental turn in his approach to this theme. This turn led him toward a double process of reduction: first, from psychoanalytical categories to a phenomenology of the capable human being, and from there to a temporal ontology.
At the beginning of this article we referred to the twofold expressivity of representation as a means of understanding the articulation between desire and knowledge. When Ricoeur developed the concept of representation in Time and Narrative and in "The Mark of the Past," he focused on the epistemological side of this twofold expressivity since the economy of instincts prevented the development of the other side. 55 If in Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricoeur could articulate both sides of this expressivity, this was because he was able to reduce psychoanalytical categories to a temporal ontology.
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies The Vichy Syndrome. That is the reason why "metaphor" is in quotation marks and it is referred to page 11 of the The Vichy Syndrome. 4 The question posed is similar to Amalric's. However, Amalric will propose a correlation between ideology and utopia, as they were developed in his Ideology and Utopia, by "events that institutes a constitutive social imaginary." 
